We compare the structure and performance of private (non-GSE) mortgage-backed securities sold by large issuers vs. those sold by small issuers over the period [2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. Securities sold by large issuers have less subordination-a greater fraction of the deal receiving AAA rating-than those sold by small issuers. Prices for AAA-rated and non-AAA rated tranches sold by large issuers fell more when the market turned down than those sold by small issuers, and this difference was concentrated among tranches issued between 2004 and 2006. These results suggest that rating agencies grant unduly favorable ratings to large issuers, especially during market booming periods. JEL Classifications: G2, G1, L1.
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The explosive growth of the private, non-GSE backed mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market lies at the heart of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. This market both fueled and was fueled by the expansion of subprime credit and the housing boom. We study the role of the three primary rating agencies-Moody's, S&P, and Fitch-in the expansion of the MBS market.
Rating agencies play an important role in all fixed income markets, in part because they have access to privileged information on securities and their issuers, a privilege protected from regulations such as Reg-FD. The agencies, however, have received sharp criticism for their ratings practices in the MBS market. Many critics point to a potential conflict in rating agencies' fees and income structure. Instead of being compensated by the investors who consume their product, issuers pay the rating agencies. The conflict of interest hypothesis thus stipulates that agencies may provide unduly favorable ratings, especially to large issuers who bring, and could potentially take away, substantial revenues.
The risk of lost reputation, and hence lost future profits, potentially offsets the conflict of interest problem. Because this industry has just three dominant players, loss of reputation stemming from ratings mistakes could come with substantial costs. 1 The balance of forces in the MBS market, however, may have tilted toward ratings 'inflation,' particularly for large issuers when this new and rapidly growing market boomed between 2004 and 2006. First, the boom in housing meant that MBS generated a significant new revenue stream for rating agencies. Second, unlike the corporate bond market, a small number of large issuers of MBS brought many deals to the ratings agencies and thus had substantial bargaining power over them. 2 Theoretical research (e.g., Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2009; Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2010) shows that the perverse incentive of the rating agencies is strongest during market booms because the benefits from additional rating business generated (net of potential reputational costs) are the highest.
These facts and arguments provide the basis of our empirical study. We start by matching a large sample of MBS tranches sold between 2000 and 2006 with information on the structure, price and rating history (from Moody's, S&P and Fitch) to their issuers. Around sixty percent of the tranches are rated AAA (un-weighted), the highest possible grade, by each of the three rating agencies. We then compare tranches sold by large issuers vs. small issuers, where issuer size is based on the issuing institutions' annual market share. We also differentiate market boom years (2004) (2005) (2006) , during which the principal amount issued accounts for a large fraction of the total amount issued over the entire sample period, from the earlier years (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
To examine the structure of the MBS tranches, we use the degree of subordination, defined as the fraction of financing within a deal rated AAA. All else equal, an increase in this fraction indicates a greater degree of ratings inflation. This fraction affects issuer profits because less subordination implies more total revenues for the entire deal given the large, global demand for AAA tranches. If large issuers can exert their bargaining power and influence on rating agencies, then securities sold by large issuers, and in particular those issued during the market boom years, would have a larger fraction rated AAA (conditional on the quality of the collateral). Given the tranching and the alleged biased rating process, less subordination would in turn lower the quality conditional on the credit rating. In our second set of tests, we thus examine the ex post performance of the AAA-rated MBS securities by looking at price changes between the origination date and April, 2009. If large issuers received more favorable ratings than small issuers, then we should observe a greater price drop by securities sold by large issuers, again particularly for cohorts issued during market booming years. paper is the first to test for incentive problems of rating agencies related to issuer size; and, we take a 'valuation from outside' approach by testing whether and how the market incorporates possible biases in the rating process.
I. DATA
We begin the process of data compilation with the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
database, which provides a large sample of tranches of privately-issued (i.e. non-GSE) MBS deals.
For each deal, SDC provides the basic information on asset/collateral types (mortgage, credit card, auto loans, bonds, etc), the number of tranches, as well as information on the issuer(s) and bookrunner(s). For other deal and tranche characteristics, including initial and subsequent ratings and prices, principal amount, coupon type and rate, and maturity (weighted average life, and whether the tranche is paid off prior to April 2009), we rely on manually collected data from Bloomberg. Our sample includes more than 85,000 MBS tranches originated and issued between 2000 and 2006. Table 1 reports the top five issuers in each year of our sample period. We rank institutions in a given year on the number of deals issued that year. We also derive issuer rankings based on the dollar amount issued in each year and this alternative procedure yields very similar rankings (not reported). Brothers, and IndyMac, failed during the ensuing crisis! The MBS market is highly concentrated among large issuers, with the top five accounting for 38% to 47% of all the newly issued securities.
The dominance of large issuers implies that they have considerable bargaining power over rating agencies as they can bring and take away tremendous amounts of rating business.
II. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
Cash flows and risk are evaluated quite differently in structured finance products compared to the traditional corporate bond market. The cash flows and risks of corporate bonds -and hence ratings -are tied to the performance and growth prospects of one company. By contrast, structured finance involves a securitization process with pooling and tranching (possibly multiple times) of a large number of credit-sensitive assets. For a fixed collateral pool (in the case of MBS, these would be home mortgages), structured finance separates the pool into prioritized claims called tranches, which absorb losses from the underlying portfolio following seniority; hence, tranche-level ratings depend both on the risks and diversification of the collateral pool as well as on the structuring of the cash flows. While securitization has revolutionized fixed income markets and brought billions of dollars of revenues to Wall Street, for many investors, even some institutional investors, this process can be opaque and filled with problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard. of all corporate bonds are AAA rated). The pooling and tranching process eliminates most of the idiosyncratic risk of underlying assets, while the remaining systematic risk implies higher expected returns. For regulated banks, broker dealers, and insurance companies, AAA-rated credits are attractive because little regulatory capital needs to be held in reserve. Moreover, seemingly safe structured finance products were used to increase the supply of collateral backing repurchase agreements that many institutional investors used to manage their liquidity risk (Gorton and Metrick, 2010) . Hence, securitization helps supply the very strong demand for highly rated assets.
Our main hypothesis is that credit rating agencies (Moody's, S&P, and Fitch) favor large issuers because these issuers bring in more rating businesses and revenues. Moreover, the incentive toward favoritism ought to be stronger during market booming periods. More favorable ratings imply a greater fraction of financing in the highly-rated tranches (i.e. the AAA slice), which implies greater risk across all tranches within a deal. Figure 1 amount of all tranches in the deal. 4 "Big issuer" indicates that the market share falls into the top 10% of the market share distribution in a given year, while "Small issuer" refers to the other issuers in the same year.
Figure 1: Fraction of Financing in AAA Tranches
This figure shows the median of the fraction of total deal-level financing rated AAA for privately-issued MBS. The sample includes all MBS deals whose tranches received ratings from Moody's, S&P, or Fitch. "Fraction of AAA Tranches" is the total principal amount of all AAA tranches in an MBS deal, divided by the total principal amount of all tranches in that deal. Issuer market share is calculated as the number of deals originated by the issuer divided by the total number of deals in the current year. "Big issuer" means that the market share of the issuer falls into the top 10% of the market share distribution in that year, and "Small issuer" refer to the rest of issuers in that year.
A few interesting patterns emerge from Figure 1 . The median fraction of financing in AAA tranches sold by large and small issuers is quite similar in 2000 (just above 96% for the median deal), but then trends downward for both groups of securities as the housing and MBS markets grew. More importantly, we observe a divergence in the degree of subordination between deals sold by large vs. small issuers-deals sold by large issuers have a larger fraction rated AAA than those sold by small issuers. The gap increases over time, peaking at about 10 percentage points in 2006, the height of the boom. The patterns in Figure 1 could occur if small issuers moved more aggressively over time into the riskiest segments of the sub-prime mortgage markets. This possibility seems inconsistent with Table 1 , however, which shows that the five largest issuers in 2006 all failed. Moreover, He, Qian and Strahan (2010) find similar patterns to those in Figure 1 , controlling for observable dimensions of collateral risk and diversification. Hence, Figure 1 suggests that large issuers received more favorable ratings from the agencies, and that this effect grew stronger as the market boomed.
If large-issuer deals really receive inflated ratings -if there is not sufficient subordinationthen AAA-rated tranches ought to perform worse when the market crashes. To test this notion, we compare the ex-post performance of AAA-rated tranches sold by large vs. small issuers. Our measure of ex post performance equals the cumulative percent change (drop in this case) in the price between the issuance date and April, 2009 (or its payoff date). About 45% of the tranches that we have information on pricing history are paid off early and before the crisis. 5 As in Figure 1 , we sort data into two groups based on issuer size and we also separate the data into two sets of cohorts 
III. FINAL REMARKS
Our paper tests whether conflicts of interest affected ratings in one of the largest and fastest growing credit markets. Most agree that rating agencies played an integral role in the rise and fall of housing and subprime lending. Our findings suggest that ratings mistakes were systematically correlated with issuer size and market conditions. All three major rating agencies were more optimistic for securities sold by large issuers during the boom years. A larger fraction of MBS deals sold by large issuers receive AAA ratings than deals sold by small issuers. Tranches sold by large issuers then experience larger price drops than those sold by smaller issuers when the 'housing bubble' began to unravel. These structural and performance differences are concentrated among deals packaged and sold during the market boom years of 2004 through 2006. We conclude that the conflict of interest problem of rating agencies likely played a significant role in the evolution of the MBS markets.
